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Abstract
In our experience, all textbook presentations of the Slutsky Equation under a discrete price
change use a compensation scheme based on the compensating variation. Our students have
sensed this convention is arbitrary in that they have asked, why consider this compensation
scheme, and not one based on the equivalent variation? The present paper outlines how one
might address this matter analytically, and then discusses how our findings provide a new
insight into the Giffen Paradox.
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I. Introduction 
 
  The Slutsky Equation has a long and venerated history in microeconomics. It was 
first articulated by Eugene Slutsky (1915) over ninety years ago, and was revisited in 
such classics as Hicks and Allen (1934), and Hicks (1939).
1  Today, the Slutsky Equation 
is a staple of most modern microeconomics textbooks [e.g., Luenberger (1995), Roberts 
and Schulze (1976), Takayama (1993), and Varian (1992 and 2003)], and remains a topic 
of ongoing research  [e.g., Raiklin (1990), Panik (2002), and Weber (2002a and 2002b)].  
  In our experience, all textbook presentations of the Slutsky Equation under a 
discrete price change use a compensation scheme based on the compensating variation. 
Our students have sensed this convention is arbitrary in that they have asked, why 
consider this compensation scheme, and not one based on the equivalent variation?  
The present paper outlines how one might address this matter analytically, and then 
discusses how our findings provide a new insight into the Giffen Paradox. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the case of the 
decision maker without an endowment under an arbitrary utility function, and Section III 
outlines the case of a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Section IV outlines the case of the 
decision maker with an endowment, and then it argues that whether a good can be labeled 
a Giffen Good or not may come down to the analyst’s choice of the compensation 
scheme and the magnitude of the price change. Concluding remarks are offered in 
Section V.  
 
II. An Arbitrary Utility Function 
 
Consider a decision maker (DM) in an n-good world. Let pi denote the price for 
the ith good (where i = 1,n), let xi denote the quantity of the ith good, let m denote the 







= ∑  denote the DM’s budget constraint. Let U = 
12 ( , , .., ) n Uxx x  denote the DM’s (well-behaved) utility function, let
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12 ( , ,.., , ) in x pp pm  denote the DM’s n ordinary demand functions at initial prices, and let 
12 ( , ,.., , ) n VV p pp m =  denote his associated indirect utility function. 
  Suppose that the price of the jth good,  , j p , jj is perturbed to p p +∆  where 
0 j p ∆≠. It follows that the level of demand for the jth good at initial prices and income 
is 
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*(.., ,.., ) jj j x pp m +∆ . 
After Hicks (1956), the compensating variation (CV) is defined as “the maximum 
amount of income that could be taken from someone who gains from a particular change 
while still leaving him no worse off than before the change”, and the equivalent variation 
(EV) is defined as “the minimum amount that someone who gains from a particular 
change would be willing to accept to forego the change” [Pearce (1992, p. 78)]. 
Therefore, associated with the price change,  j p ∆ , the CV may be restated as: 
                                                           
1 For a recent history of the Slutsky Equation, see Chipman and Lenfant (2002).   2
 
11 (.., ,.., ) (.., ,.., )|
j jj j m C V Vpm Vp pmm ∆= =+ ∆ + ∆
     (1) 
 
and the EV may be restated as: 
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The DM’s ordinary demand function for the jth good under a compensation scheme 
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Likewise, the DM’s ordinary demand function for the jth good under a compensation 
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  These ideas lead to two propositions, which serve as the basis for two alternative 
definitions of the Slutsky Equation: 
 
Proposition 1 [The Slutsky Equation Under The CV-Type Compensation Scheme]: 
If   12 ( , , .., ), n UU x x x =  if , jj j p is perturbed to p p +∆  and if the DM is compensated 
for 0 j p ∆≠ by  0 j mC V ∆= ≠, then the associated Slutsky Equation is: 
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Proof: By definition, 
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Assume 0 j mC V ∆= ≠. Since 
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, and by Equation (5): 
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Proposition 2 [The Slutsky Equation Under The EV-Type Compensation Scheme]: 
If   12 ( , , .., ), n UU x x x =  if , jj j p is perturbed to p p +∆  and if the DM is compensated 
for 0 j p ∆≠ by  0 j mE V ∆= ≠, then the associated Slutsky Equation is: 
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Proof: The proof here would be the mirror image of the proof for Proposition 1. • 
 
Remark 1: It would seem that Proposition 1 serves as the sole analytical basis for 
graphical, textbook presentations of the Slutsky Equation, in that we are not aware of any 
textbook that presents a graph from the vantage point of Proposition 2. The dominance of 
one vantage point over the other is arbitrary and (as shown in Section IV below) 
potentially misleading. 
 
Remark 2: The difference between the SEs under the CV- and EV-type compensation 
schemes, and the difference between the IEs under the same two compensation schemes, 
may increase as  j p ∆ increases, a fact that underscores the need for caution in electing one 
compensation scheme over the other.
2 Conversely, any differences may tend to zero as 
the discrete price change,  j p ∆ , goes to zero.
3  
 
III. A Cobb-Douglas Utility Function 
 
The objective here is to show that the SE (or alternatively, the IE) under one 
compensation scheme may not be identical to its counterpart under the other, and this by 
applying Propositions 1 and 2 to the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. To 
develop these results, we require function-specific definitions of the ordinary demand 
function, the indirect utility function, the CV, and the EV. In particular, 
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and the associated indirect utility function is: 
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, and   
                                                           
2 Because the CV and EV are identical under a quasi-linear utility function [Varian (2003, Chapter 14)], the 
word, “may”, is used. 
3 This last result echoes a similar claim by Mosak (1942), in the case of a comparison of the SEs and IEs 
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. 
Proof: Parts (a) and (b) follow directly from Equations (1), (2), and (6).   •      
  
  With Lemma 2 in place, we are in a position to present the function-specific 
counterparts to Propositions 1 and 2. These are presented next: 
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Remark 3: As a numerical example of the above, suppose that the DM resides in a two-
good world, and he has a Cobb-Douglas utility function of the following form, 
12 1 2 (, ) . Uxx xx = . Suppose too that  1 1 p = ,  1 1 p ∆ = , and  100 m = . His associated 




IV. Is This Good A Giffen Good or Not? It Depends .. 
 
If the DM’s initial endowment, ( ) 12 , ,.., n ω ωω , is added to the choice-theoretical 
framework, then the Slutsky Equation under the CV-type compensation scheme is:   6
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denotes the associated combined income effect (CIE). Likewise, the Slutsky Equation  
under the EV-type compensation scheme is: 
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  Compensation       The Amount of     SE    IE    TE 
Method    Compensation 
 
  mC V ∆=    41.421    -14.645   -10.355   -25.000     
 
  mE V ∆=    -  29.289  -10.355   -14.645   -25.000   
 
 
Remark 4: The component parts of the CIE in Equations (7) and (8) can be viewed two 
ways: (a) The CIE can be seen as the sum of the ordinary income effect (OIE), and the 
endowment income effect (EIE). For example, in the case of Equation (7),   
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The same sort of statement can be made for Equation (8), in which  2 OIE  and  2 EIE  
would be defined. (b) In addition, the CIE can be seen to be the product of two terms. For 
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then  11 1 . CIE A B = . The same sort of statement can be made for Equation (8), in which 2 A , 
2 B , and  2 CIE  would be defined. 
 
Remark 5: The importance of Remark 4 is this: (a) If sign(Ak) = - sign(Bk) where k = 
1,2, then CIEk < 0. Since the SEk < 0, then sign(Ak) = - sign(Bk) implies TEk < 0. (b) 
However, if sign(Ak) = sign(Bk), then the sign(CIEk) depends on the relative magnitudes, 
|| k SE  and | | k CIE . Stated differently, since the SEk < 0, then sign(Ak) = sign(Bk) implies 
TEk < 0, if and only if | | | | 0 kk SE CIE −> . Alternatively, if sign(Ak) = sign(Bk), and if 
||| | 0 kk SE CIE −< , then TEk > 0, all of which serves to define a Giffen Good.  
 
Remark 6: In Sections II and III, we argued that both the choice of compensation 
scheme and the magnitude of the price change, j p ∆ , can affect the magnitudes of the SEk 
and IEk (or alternatively defined, the OIEk). It follows from this that if sign(Ak) = 
sign(Bk), then the choice of the compensation scheme, and of the magnitude of  , j p ∆  may 
affect the sign of the difference, ||| | kk k SE OIE EIE −+ , and hence the sign of the TEk.  
 
Remark 7:  In a sense, the discussion in the present section offers the discrete 
counterpart to Berg’s (1987) analysis of the choice-theoretical foundations of the Giffen 
Paradox, and to some of the arguments in the prior debate [e.g., Dougan (1982), and 
Dooley (1983a, 1983b, and 1985)]. But in another sense, this paper in the aggregate 
offers a new twist, which is: whether a good can be labeled a Giffen Good or not depends   8
in part upon the interplay of two factors -- the analyst’s choice of the compensation 
scheme and the magnitude of the price change,  j p ∆ . 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
We began this paper by noting that the textbook presentation of the Slutsky 
Equation under a discrete price change uses a compensation scheme based on the 
compensating variation. The question was then posed, how to define the Slutsky Equation 
when the compensation scheme is based on the equivalent variation? This paper then 
outlined analytically how the Slutsky Equation might be defined under both schemes.  
This paper then outlined how the present analysis extends our common 
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